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1. Introduction
Fish markets are usually described as paradoxical for two reasons. First,
there is a high price dispersion for a relatively homogeneous good (Vignes and
Etienne, 2011). Second, each additional link in the fish supply chain decreases
the quality of the product (Wiefels, 2005). Although both paradoxes are related
to the perishability of the good, the latter one is being overcome in developed
countries by shortening the supply chain. The best example is the model of
Community Supported Fishery (CSF).2 In a CSF buyers pay, in advance, an
annual fee for a share of the producers’ periodical yield. This agreement trans-
fers part of the risk from the producers to the consumers and, in exchange,
commitments regarding more sustainable production are often pursued (Brown
and Miller, 2008; Brinson et al., 2011). Such mechanisms, designed to add
value and shorten the fish supply chain, are encouraged as a way to improve the
fisheries’ conditions in Africa, Asia and Latin America (FAO, 2008).3
The broader question we ask in this paper, which we address using a lab-
in-the-field experiment, is whether such a mechanism conditionally rewarding
sustainable behavior can be implemented in a developing country. The main
difference with respect to developed countries is that its implementation needs
to consider the large proportion of small-scale fisheries, which are more labor-
intensive and have lower entry costs than large-scale fisheries. This mechanism
may have three advantages for small-scale fishermen. First, conditional rewards
help screening the community’s commitment capacity, which is determinant in
building long-term relationships.4 Second, the conditional nature of the mecha-
2The CSF is inspired in the successful model of Community Supported Agriculture (CSA).
By 2010, there were over 2,500 CSAs in the United States and 13 CSFs in Northeast United
States and Canada (Brinson et al., 2011).
3Wiefels (2005) points out for the Latin American case: “The challenge is thus not to
produce more but to produce better. On a commercial point of view, it is not so much the
case of selling more but of selling better. Selling better means here to sell the same quantities
of catches for better prices.”
4Evidence for developing countries show that long-term relationships have economic advan-
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nism may transfer the monitoring costs from an outsider (e.g., an environmental
authority) to the insiders, for whom monitoring should be less costly. Third,
whereas alternative strategies to reward sustainability such as eco-labeling in-
volve high fixed-costs, the conditional reward mechanisms transfer part of the
producers’ risk to the consumers.
Nonetheless, the implementation of conditional rewards on small-scale fish-
eries encompasses some difficulties. This paper focuses on the early issue of
how to select communities to maximize the cost-efficiency of the conditional
incentives. A selection criterion that needs to be understood is the history of
successful management of the common resource. The reason is that this criterion
is politically salient (e.g., fishermen communities may demand a meritocratic
allocation of rewarding schemes), but its expected effect is not clear. The novel
conditional rewards may crowd-out the fishermen’s ability to solve the collective
action problem when material rewards were smaller.
Consider an adaptation of Be´nabou and Tirole’s framework (2006) where
the extraction decision in the social dilemma is the sum of the intrinsic and
extrinsic motivations.5 The intrinsic motivation to preserve the resource is
greater in communities keeping a healthier fish stock, and it arises from the
interplay between social norms and market and technological constraints. The
extrinsic motivation, on the other hand, is connected to the material rewards
from resource management. The crowding-out may occur if a situation that
originally signaled intrinsic motivation, such as not over-exploiting the resource,
becomes a situation signaling individual’s desire for money if rewards increase.6
tages in bilateral agreements, such as prioritized demand after negative shocks on the supply
side (Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2015; Ghani and Reed, 2014).
5 Be´nabou and Tirole’s model (2006) includes reputational motivations. We simplify the
setting by arguing that in small fishermen communities the intrinsic and reputational moti-
vations are tightly related and hence they can be combined in a single term.
6See Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) for an example of environmental crowding-out trig-
gered by a monetary compensation for a nuclear waste repository. See Bowles and Polania-
Reyes (2012) for a survey on crowding effects caused by the introduction of economic incen-
tives.
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The effect of an increase in the material rewards for sustainability could be
very difficult to evaluate with naturally occurring data. There might be self-
selection on the type of contractual schemes adopted by a fishermen community.
Even if incentives are randomly allocated, the open access nature of the resource
makes very hard to have control on environmental variables and to prevent
hidden actions from fishermen such as side-selling. Therefore, we consider a
lab-in-the-field experiment to be an appropriate initial step to shed light on
whether conditional incentives may work or not.
We conduct an experiment with monetary incentives aiming to test a mech-
anism conditionally rewarding sustainable behavior. More precisely, we offer a
contract that conditions the price per unit to the aggregate catch. Half of the
participants are randomly assigned to a treatment with this payment scheme,
which we call the conditional contract. It is inspired in a Cournot game with
a downward-sloping demand function that provides collective incentives to de-
crease extraction. However, as in the standard commons dilemma, individual
incentives are aligned with a higher and suboptimal extraction level. The other
half of the participants are assigned to a payment scheme with a flat-rate, which
we call the fixed price treatment.
We hypothesize that fishermen with higher intrinsic motivation will reach
similar outcomes with either the conditional contract or the fixed price. Con-
trarily, fishermen with higher extrinsic motivation would greatly benefit from
the conditional contract compared to the fixed price.
We test this hypothesis by conducting the experiment with fishermen from
two neighboring communities that, despite their proximity, display different
levels of intrinsic motivation. Both communities are located in Baru´, an island
in the Colombian Caribbean. Fishermen in the southern side of the island,
which we label the intrinsically motivated, are inside a marine protected area
(MPA) that imposes tighter technological restrictions for fishing. They also
face tighter market constraints because getting to the city takes longer and
is more expensive. We label the fishermen in the northern side of the island
as the extrinsically motivated. This label does not mean that they lack an
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intrinsic motivation, but rather that the relative weight they put to the extrinsic
motivation is larger than for their southern neighbors.
We find that the conditional contract outperforms the fixed price. The dura-
tion of the resource before its collapse increases by 23 percent. Efficiency, defined
as the ratio between the actual surplus and the surplus obtained through the
social planner’s solution, increases by 100 percent with the conditional contract.
More importantly, the effect of the contract is drastically different between
populations. The conditional contract increases efficiency by 221 percent in the
extrinsically motivated community, and only by (a non-significant) 25 percent
in the intrinsically motivated community.
Although fishermen characteristics differ between locations, the conditional
contract and the fixed price treatments are randomly allocated within each
community. Apart from the pricing scheme, every other feature of the game,
including the initial stock level, the logistic growth function describing the re-
source dynamics, and the stochastic production function, are the same for every
participant. The latter two characteristics are methodological novelties from our
experimental design providing a more familiar context to the fishermen taking
part in this “framed field experiment” (Harrison and List, 2004). This novel
CPR dynamic game is also tested on a sample of undergraduate students. The
results are discussed on a separate paper.
The execution of the experiment is as follows. Groups of four subjects are
assigned to a board endowed with 100 homogeneous resource units (fish). The
current stock is public information. Every period, the subjects select their level
of extraction effort (fishing trips), ranging from 1 to 3. Every extraction effort
unit is costless and grants a dice roll with three potential equiprobable outcomes
(caught units): 1, 3 and 5. The aggregate catch and the corresponding price
are publicly announced. Subjects accumulate earnings in each period according
to either the conditional contract or the fixed price. This procedure is repeated
until depletion, closure of the resource (i.e., if the stock level is below 12 units),
or if they reach the terminal tenth period of the game.
The Nash equilibrium prediction, assuming self-regarding preferences, will be
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effort maximization for both pricing schemes. Compared to the social planner’s
solution, resource duration will be shorter (30% of the maximum), total yield
will be lower (66% of the maximum) and efficiency, by construction, will be
zero.
By setting the Nash equilibrium as a zero efficiency benchmark we can com-
pare the two communities across pricing schemes. With the fixed price, which
serves as baseline for this analysis, the efficiency in the intrinsically and the ex-
trinsically motivated communities is 40 and 17 percent, respectively. This result
supports the argument that intrinsic motives provide an advantage in resource
management in absence of highly salient material rewards. With the conditional
contract the efficiency increases to 50 and 53 percent in the intrinsically and
the extrinsically motivated communities, respectively. The larger effect of the
conditional reward for the extrinsically motivated fishermen closes the efficiency
gap between locations.
We further analyze the individual responses to past group behavior to shed
light on why the conditional rewards work differently between communities. We
find evidence of reciprocal responses in the extrinsically motivated community,
but only with the conditional contract. That is, a decrease in aggregate extrac-
tion increases the price paid per unit, triggering a decrease in individual effort
in the next period. In the intrinsically motivated community we observe the op-
posite reaction. That is, an increase in aggregate extraction triggers a decrease
in individual effort in the next period, regardless of the payment scheme.
The paper proceeds as follows. A description of the relevant experimental
literature is presented in Section 2. The fishermen’s optimization problem under
the two pricing schemes is presented in Section 3. We then describe the study
site in Section 4, emphasizing on the observed characteristics that have led us
to label the communities as intrinsically and extrinsically motivated. The full
experimental design is explained in Section 5. Results are presented and dis-
cussed in Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Our concluding remarks are presented
in Section 8.
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2. Related literature
Open-access fishing is a classical example of the common-pool resource (CPR
hereafter) problem. The non-excludability and rivalry from the resource lead
to the pessimistic prediction of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).
Several market and non-market institutions have been studied to better under-
stand how the tragedy can be avoided. Non-market institutions are related to
appropriators’ attributes that favor local governance (Ostrom, 2002). Market
institutions are based on the allocation of property rights and certifications for
sustainable production.
The different market institutions offer some advantages and disadvantages in
the management of common property resources. Individual property rights are
assigned through individual transferable quotas (Copes et al., 1986). Although
they decrease competition among fishermen, they do not create the appropri-
ate incentives to minimize unintended catch and to reduce the damage on the
ecosystem (Beddington et al., 2007). Collective property rights, on the othe
hand, are allocated through the definition of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)
and Territorial Use Rights (TURFS). They are focused on the regulation of
fishing gear and catch seasons on specific ecosystems. However, they are con-
sidered to displace the problem elsewhere rather than providing a definitive
solution (Beddington et al., 2007). Certifications given to “sustainable fish-
eries,” also known as eco-labelling strategies, aim to target consumers willing to
pay for an invironmentally friendly product (Potts and Haward, 2007). In this
case, the criticism is that eco-labelling requires consumer education programs
and extensive market research to be adequately targeted (Wessells et al., 1999).
Conditional schemes, such as the Community Supported Fisheries (CSF),
recently emerged as an alternative to reward sustainable production. The plat-
form is attractive to fishermen because it allows them to transfer part of the
risk to the consumer in exchange for better fishing practices. Buyers pay in
advance for the product that will be delivered in the future, and in case of a
negative production shock they will be compensated in future deliveries (Brown
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and Miller, 2008; Brinson et al., 2011).
The experimental literature on CPR games has focused on the exploration
of collective action, the allocation of property rights and permits, and pecuniary
and non-pecuniary penalties (Ostrom et al., 1992, 1994; Ca´rdenas et al., 2000;
Walker et al., 2000; Ostrom, 2006; Lo´pez et al., 2010; Velez et al., 2012). Condi-
tional rewarding schemes remain mostly unexplored in CPR games despite their
potential in promoting efficiency-enhancing outcomes.
Some implicit forms of conditional contracts have been experimentally tested
for labor market exchanges, both in the lab and the field (Fehr et al., 1998;
Shearer, 2004; Gneezy and List, 2006). Besides, one may interpret threshold
public good games as implicitly offering a conditional contract. The return
of the investment in the common fund is conditioned to specific contribution
levels above or below this threshold, which provides a focal point facilitating
coordination in the social dilemma (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999; Croson and
Marks, 2000).
Recent experimental designs connect the institutional analysis with specific
features of the resource. For instance, Ca´rdenas et al. (2013) propose three
games specifically designed to analyze the collective action problem in fisheries,
forests and irrigation channels. In the fishery game subjects allocate effort in
one of two available locations, knowing that resource’s availability depends on
the local aggregate effort in the previous period. This deterministic separa-
tion between effort and yield also appears in Moreno-Sa´nchez and Maldonado’s
(2010) experimental design.
Another strand of artefactual field experiments has focused on the connec-
tion between behavior in the game and field data from actual users of natu-
ral resources. Existing research studies the relationship between productivity
and conditional cooperation (Carpenter and Seki, 2011); fishermen’s extrac-
tive capacity, cooperativeness and impatience (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011); and
coxswains’ sharing norms in the field and in the lab (Jang and Lynham, 2015).
A recent study, involving real fishing in a recreational pond, shows that recre-
ational fishermen are less cooperative in the field that in the lab (Stoop et al.,
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2012).
The methodological contribution of our design is twofold. First, we introduce
a stochastic production function to capture the artisanal fishermen’s variance
in their yield per effort unit. Previous CPR experiments have found that uncer-
tainty in environmental variables, such as stock size, growth rate and carrying
capacity, increase over-harvesting behavior (Budescu et al., 1995; Jager et al.,
2002; Kopelman et al., 2002). Introducing a stochastic component in the pay-
offs function on a public goods game has the same efficiency-decreasing effect
(Berger and Hershey, 1994; Bereby-Meyer and Roth, 2006). Ours is, to the
best of our knowledge, the first CPR experimental game with uncertainty in
the production function.
Second, we use a logistic growth function to emulate the resource dynamics
in the open access fishery. Previous experiments have introduced the dynamics
of the CPR in several ways. Herr et al. (1997) add time-dependent externalities
by increasing extraction costs over time. Chermak and Krause (2002) introduce
a CPR game with overlapping generations harvesting the resource at different
moments in time. In Fischer et al.’s CPR game (2004), generations do not
overlap and subjects made their decision without knowing their actual genera-
tion. Janssen et al. (2010) combine spatial and temporal resource dynamics by
allowing subjects to move over time within a grid in which renewal rate of the
resource is density dependent. In Ca´rdenas et al.’s forestry game (2013) the re-
source reproduces at a linear growth rate between decision periods. Our logistic
growth function is closer to the traditional bioeconomic models (Gordon, 1954),
and it is also very intuitive for the participants.
3. The model
The backbone of our model captures the rivalry and non-excludability of
a CPR. It has three key elements: the stochastic production function, the re-
source’s logistic growth function, and the pricing scheme from which CPR users
benefit from.
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3.1. The decision problem
A set of n = 4 symmetric players jointly extracts from an open access fishery.
Each player i chooses his level of extraction effort eit ∈ {1, 2, 3} to be allocated
in the common resource in the period t. The player’s yield, or catch Y it , depends
on the realized state of nature ω ∈ {ω1, ω2, ω3} for each one of the j effort units.
It can be written as:
Y it =
∑eit
j=1 µj(ω),
with µj(ω) being a random shock independently and identically distributed such
that µj(ω1) = 1, µj(ω2) = 3 and µj(ω3) = 5 and p(ω1) = p(ω2) = p(ω3) = 1/3.
At the end of each period of time t all the fish is sold at price Pt(Yt). The price
depends on the period’s aggregate extraction Yt =
∑n
i=1 Y
i
t . We define player
i’s payoff in period t as piit = PtY
i
t , and the accumulate payoff over time as
Πi =
∑10
t=1 pi
i
t.
We assume that extraction effort is costless to minimize the confounding
effects between other-regarding preferences and risk preferences.7 This costless
effort, apart from simplifying the decision setting, leads to a “two-layer” social
dilemma. The first layer arises from the dynamic nature of the resource. Sub-
jects maximize their current yield given the difficulty to secure future property
rights. But by doing so they decrease the value of the future stock. The second
layer appears with the introduction of the conditional contract. By construc-
tion, it creates a tension between individual and collective incentives due to the
downward sloping demand function. It will be explained in detail in Section 3.3.
The resource’s dynamics are given by Xt+1 − Xt = F (Xt) − Yt. To define
the growth function F (Xt) we adopt the logistic functional form proposed in
Gordon-Schaeffer’s bioeconomic model (Gordon, 1954):
F (Xt) = rXt − rX
2
t
K
,
7With costly extraction effort a risk averse subject could have chosen a lower extraction to
minimize the variance of its income across states of nature. Yet, it could have been confounded
with prosocial behavior.
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where the intrinsic growth rate is set at r = 1/3 and the carrying capacity is
fixed at K = 100. Besides, the initial stock level X0 is set equal to the carrying
capacity.
Each group is subject to three termination rules which are common knowl-
edge: (a) players reach the terminal period of the game T = 10; (b) the stock
level Xt goes below a threshold point C˜ ≡ 12, leading to the resource’s closure;
and (c) the total catch is at least as high as the current stock level (Yt ≥ Xt),
leading to the resource’s depletion. Subjects do not receive any additional pay-
off for the remaining stock when rules (a) or (b) apply. If rule (c) applies,
and Yt > Xt, the available units are divided proportionally to the intended
individual catch.
3.2. Predictions with the fixed price
In this scenario the price is not conditioned to the aggregate catch. That is,
Pt(Yt) = Pt ∀ t. We can write the optimization problem as:
Max
eit∈{1,2,3}
10∑
t=1
IXt>C˜
Pt × e∑
j=1
µj(ω)

subject to Xt+1 =
(
rXt − rX
2
t
K
)
+Xt −
4∑
i=1
e∑
j=1
µj(ω)
where IXt>C˜ is an indicator function whose value switches from 1 to 0 after the
threshold C˜ is surpassed.
It is straightforward to check that the solution to the optimization problem
with risk-neutral individualistic preferences is eit = 3∀t. The reason is that
effort is costless and µj(ω) is strictly positive irrespective of the state of nature
ω. This is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. If all the group
members follow this strategy the expected aggregate yield per period will be
E(Yt) = 36, the resource will last three periods before crossing the threshold C˜,
and the total extraction Y =
∑
t Yt will be 108 units.
The social planner’s solution is different because it incorporates the trade-
off between the immediate benefits of extraction and the future value of the
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stock. Whereas a single subject only internalizes as a cost its contribution to
the resource’s depletion −Y it , the social planner internalizes as a cost the total
aggregate catch −∑Y it . In the socially efficient solution total extraction is
maximized by extending the resource’s duration to the 10th and last period of
the game, reaching a total expected extraction of E(Y ) = 162 units. This is
150% the total predicted extraction under the Nash equilibrium.
The social planner’s solution can be reached through several paths. This
is due to the discreteness of the strategy set: the feasible aggregate effort level
ranges from 4 units (when eit = 1∀ i), to 12 units (when eit = 3∀ i). Nonetheless,
the pattern of every efficiency-maximizing path is similar: a medium-to-high
extraction effort early in the game (periods 1-2), a low extraction effort in
intermediate periods, and a medium-to-high extraction at the end of the game
(periods 9-10).
The intuition for this extraction path is the following: the social planner
will move towards the stock level maximizing the growth rate (K/2). Once the
targeted stock is reached, the social planner will minimize the exerted effort to
make the difference between harvest and growth rate as small as possible. This
would have been the steady state solution in an infinite horizon game. With a
finite horizon, as in our case, the incentives to deplete the resource before the
end of the game shift upwards the effort levels in the final periods.
3.3. Predictions with the conditional contract
Let us consider the scenario in which the price is a non-increasing function
of the group’s aggregate catch, or Pt(Yt) with dPt/dYt ≤ 0. This conditional
contract rewards a decrease in extraction effort in two ways. Like in the fixed
price treatment, the future stock value increases when aggregate extraction de-
creases. But unlike the fixed price treatment, it also grants an immediate reward
through an additional compensation in the price per unit. This immediate re-
ward is what we defined earlier as the second layer of the social dilemma. There
is a tension between the collective incentive to marginally contribute to an in-
crease in the price paid per unit, and the individual incentive to maximize the
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catch and free-ride on the others’ contribution to raise the price.
The downward sloping demand from our setting is shown in Table 1. The
function Pt(Yt) was calibrated to warrant that (risk neutral) subjects cannot
benefit from decreasing the extraction effort eit to raise Pt by themselves. It
can be easily checked that an increase in the price requires at least two subjects
willing to decrease their effort. Hence, the Nash equilibrium eit = 3∀t remains
unaltered with the conditional contract.
Table 1: Price offered as a function of the aggregate catch in the CONTRACT treatment
Quantity 4-12 13-20 21-28 29-40 41-60
Price/unit 5 4 3 2 1
The social planner’s solution with the conditional contract also reaches the
10th terminal period. The income maximization gives $672 and an expected
aggregate yield of 159 units. If, on the other hand, total yield is maximized
then total income is $666 and the expected aggregate yield is 162 units. In
both cases the social planner’s extraction path follows the same pattern than
in the fixed price treatment: medium-to-high extraction in early periods, low
extraction in intermediate periods, and medium-to-high extraction at the end
of the game.
We take yield maximization as the reference point for the efficiency analysis.
The reason is that the maximum aggregate yield is the same across treatments.
We also set Pt = $2 ∀ t under the fixed price treatment. In this way, the total
income under the Nash equilibrium is $216 in both treatments. This is very
useful for interpretation purposes: any additional earnings from the conditional
reward are the result (in expectation) of deviations from selfish behavior. The
social planner’s income will be of $324 and $666 with the fixed price and the
conditional contract, respectively.
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4. Study setting
4.1. The community’s degree of resource dependence
We conduct the experiments in three municipality subdivisions or corregimien-
tos located in the Baru´ Island:8 Baru´, Ararca and Santana. All three cor-
regimientos are administratively dependent on the city of Cartagena. Baru´ is
located in the southern side of the island, farther from the city than Ararca and
Santana (see Figure 1). The latter two corregimientos, located in the northern
side of the island, are halfway by land between Baru´ and Cartagena.
We label the fishermen in the southern and the northern side of the island as
intrinsically and extrinsically motivated, respectively. For abreviation purposes
we refer to the respective subsamples as the INTRINSIC and EXTRINSIC.
Fishermen in the INTRINSIC subsample are inside a Marine Protected Area
(MPA). As a consequence, they face a tighter technological constraint in the
employed fishing gear. They also have poorer access to labor and credit markets
compared to fishermen in the EXTRINSIC subsample. The greater distance
to the city translates into transportation costs that are three times larger for
the fishermen in the south compared to those in the north side of the island.9
Besides, fishermen in the northern side have access to another corregimiento
that serves for them as an additional market.
The differences in market access and fishing gear are shown on panel (a)
in Table 2. The fraction of fishermen selling their catch to the monopsonistic
buyers is 72% in the INTRINSIC subsample and 56% in the EXTRINSIC sub-
sample. Fishermen report in the post-experimental survey that these buyers
also act as their source of informal insurance.10
8The Baru´ island has an extension of 60 km2. It was originally known as the Baru´ Peninsula
until the XVII century, when it was separated it from the continental mass to build a canal
connecting Cartagena with the country’s most important river.
9Land transportation is highly constrained from the south side of the island in vehicles
different from motorbikes. Therefore, the best option available for fishermen in this community
is speed-boat transportation.
10Ice and gas are borrowed by fishermen at the beginning of the journey and they repay
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Figure 1: Map of the National Natural Park “Corales del Rosario y San Bernardo,” the
Marine Protected Area defining our site location. Source: “Plan Ba´sico de Manejo Ambiental
(Parques Nacionales)”. The purple line defines the limits of the park. Red areas highlight
densely populated areas.
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Table 2: Mean tests by subsample’s location. The number of subjects from inside and outside
the MPA is 32 and 48, respectively. For categorical variables we report the p-value for the
Chi-squared test (instead of the t-test). The abbreviation [COP] refers to Colombian pesos.
EXTRINSIC INTRINSIC
Mean Mean Difference p-value
(a) Fishing inputs and market access
Sells to fish gatherer 0.563 0.719 -0.156 0.161
Boat ownership 0.646 0.563 0.083 0.460
Handlining 0.729 0.594 0.135 0.210
Harpoon 0.021 0.438 -0.417*** 0.000
Cast net 0.146 0.250 -0.104 0.248
Fish traps 0.000 0.125 -0.125* 0.012
Gill net / Trammel 0.458 0.125 0.333*** 0.001
Drag net / Boliche 0.229 0.000 0.229*** 0.003
(b) Socioeconomic characteristics
Age 48.4 37.7 10.7*** 0.001
Education [years] 2.31 5.13 -2.81*** 0.000
Other economic activities 0.479 0.656 -0.177 0.122
Weekly earnings [1,000 × COP] 164.362 139.375 24.987 0.397
Perceived relative wealth [1-10] 2.83 4.125 -1.292*** 0.008
No. adults in household 3.69 3.28 0.41 0.275
No. children in household 1.65 1.88 -0.23 0.472
Perceived luck when fishing [1-10] 6.67 6.26 0.403 0.442
Gambling in dominoes+ 0.500 0.514 -0.014 0.883
+60% of the subjects play dominoes. 80% of them bet on the outcome of the game.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel (a) also reports differences between subsamples in the employed fishing
gear. For the INTRINSIC subsample the use of harpoon and fish traps is
widely extended (44 and 13 percent, respectively) compared to the EXTRINSIC
subsample (2 and 0 percent, respectively). Handlining, another technique with
low extractive capacity, is widely used in the INTRINSIC and EXTRINSIC
with a share of their catch. Part of the debt is accumulated if the catch is not sufficient to
repay.
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subsamples, 59 and 73 percent, with no significant differences between locations.
Technologies with high extractive capacity are widespread in the EXTRINSIC
subsample. Gill nest, or trammels, are employed by 46 percent of fishermen
compared to 13 percent in the INTRINSIC subsample. The drag net known as
boliche, a more harmful and forbidden technology, is reported by 23 percent of
fishermen in the EXTRINSIC subsample, and by none of the fishermen in the
INTRINSIC subsample.
We do not observe statistical differences between subsamples in the reported
boat ownership. Nonetheless, the tenancy structure depends on the employed
technology. For technologies with low extractive capacity, frequent in the IN-
TRINSIC subsample, most fishermen work alone or at most with two other
fellows. Their incentives for group formation is to pool risk by dividing the
earnings among the crew. Boats not owned by any of the crew members are
usually property of the local monopsonistic buyer, to whom the fishermen need
to commit their catch. For technologies with high extractive capacity, frequent
in the EXTRINSIC subsample, the fishermen make larger groups due to the
physical requirements for dragging the nets. These fishermen usually report
co-ownership of the boats and the fishing gear.
4.2. Participants’ socioeconomic characteristics
The comparison of socioeconomic characteristics between the INTRINSIC
and the EXTRINSIC subsample shows that the former are younger and about
two years more educated (see panel (b) on Table 2). Moreno-Sa´nchez and Mal-
donado (2010) report similar differences between communities located inside
and outside the same MPA.11 In addition, they report that fishermen inside
the MPA are more aware of the environmental regulations and meet more often
with local environmental authorities.
Self-reported weekly earnings, on the other hand, do not differ across com-
11From the eight corregimientos that participated in Moreno-Sa´nchez and Maldonado’s
study, only Santana overlaps with our sample.
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munities. However, when the fishermen are asked about their relative wealth
with respect to their community, those in the INTRINSIC subsample consider
themselves wealthier. We also report two indirect measures of the fishermen’s
risk preferences: a self-assessment of their luck in the fishing activity and their
gambling behavior. We do not find statistical differences between subsamples
for any of these variables.
5. Experimental design
We propose a 2 × 2 factorial design with between-subjects variation. We
randomly assign groups to a payment scheme {FIXED, CONTRACT}. We im-
plement the experiment on two communities differing in their most salient source
of motivation, captured in the subsamples’ labels {INTRINSIC, EXTRINSIC}.
In the CONTRACT treatment the price is a function of aggregate extraction,
Pt(Yt), as described in Table 1. In the FIXED treatment we set Pt = $2∀Yt, t.
This is the predicted price in the CONTRACT treatment if subjects play the
Nash equilibrium.
The fishermen communities are labeled as the INTRINSIC and EXTRINSIC
subsamples. The labels are based on the relative weight that fishermen in each
location give to non-monetary motivation to preserve the resource. We argue
that the fishermen located inside the MPA are more intrinsically motivated.
This is the result of tighter technological and economic constraints, but also of
a closer relationship with authorities raising environmental awareness.
Eighty artisanal fishermen participated in the treatments reported in this
work. Another forty fishermen participated in a treatment variation in which
the relationship between extraction effort and yield is deterministic. Results
from this experimental variation, conducted only in the INTRINSIC subsample,
are reported in Mantilla and Miquel-Florensa (2016).
In the INTRINSIC subsample the participants were recruited by a local
member of the research team. He is a part time fisherman and the head of
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a fishermen association,12 with previous experience in an unrelated academic
project involving the collection of socio-economic data. We agreed on a target
of 60 to 75 subjects to be recruited, about half of the fishermen in the community.
A total of 72 fishermen from this community attended our call. The fishermen
were invited to the activity two weeks in advance. For each specific session we
invited a roughly equal number of participants from each fishermen association.
The associations are geographically distant to each other within the community,
but in general fishermen know each other.
In the EXTRINSIC subsample we contacted the head of each fishermen as-
sociation three weeks in advance. They extended the invitation to the members
of their respective association. We had a meeting a week before the experiments
to concert some details of the sampling procedure (e.g., avoid members of the
same household). In one of the corregimientos the show up rate to the activ-
ity was 35% higher than our maximum capacity, so we were able to randomly
select the participants in situ. The local member of our research team directly
invited about twenty five percent of the participants in this location, who were
independent fishermen from this community.
The activity was carried out in the communal meeting hall of each cor-
regimiento. To minimize selection issues, the experiments were conducted in
afternoon hours because the fishermen’s journey goes from 5:00 to 13:00. Table
3 reports the number of participant per treatment cell.
We ran a total of 8 sessions with 4, 8 and 12 subjects. We knew beforehand
the session size for the 3 sessions with less than 12 participants. We read aloud
the game instructions to the whole group after the subjects’ arrival. Instructions
were not provided in written form due to moderate literacy rates. Participants
signed the consent form once the procedure was clear. Groups of four subjects
12Fishermen associations serve as another source of informal insurance and also facilitate
the collective ownership of assets such as boats and storage equipment (Villamil et al., 2015).
There are four associations in the Baru´ corregimiento and three associations in Ararca and
Santana.
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Table 3: Experimental Design. Each cell contains in italics the treatment name, a combina-
tion of the two factors, and the total number of participants in that specific cell.
FIXED CONTRACT
INTRINSIC FIX-INT (N=16) CNTR-EXT (N=16)
EXTRINSIC FIX-EXT (N=24) CNTR-EXT (N=24)
were formed using a quasi-random procedure. Quasi-randomness allowed us to
balance participants from different fishermen associations and to allocate family
members (e.g., siblings from different households) to different groups.
All the groups on a given session were assigned to the same treatment.
Groups were spatially isolated from each other to avoid contamination during
the disclosure of group-specific information. Subjects could identify their fel-
low group members, but any form of communication was forbidden throughout
the whole activity. Identification of group members also implies that different
session size is not a concern. Regarding any potential reputational effect asso-
ciated to group members’ identities, we argue that it should be the same across
treatments.
The timing in every period of the game is as follows: (i) Subjects decide
the extraction effort units [fishing trips]. (ii) Subjects receive a numbered dice
per each effort unit. They also receive the number of null dices required to
have a total of three cubes per roll.13 The sides of each numbered dice were
1, 1, 3, 3, 5 and 5. The sum of the dice outcomes indicates the participant’s
yield. (iii) The monitor privately records each participant’s yield. Afterwards,
he publicly announces the aggregate effort, the aggregate yield, and computes
the stock level for the next period. Due to the dynamic nature of the game, a
board indicating the current stock level and its corresponding growth rate was
publicly available for each group of four participants. (iv) The price is computed
13By forcing participants to roll the same number of dices we guarantee that the privacy of
the decision is not altered by the noise during the rolling procedure.
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according to the pricing scheme. In the CONTRACT treatment there was also
a smaller board with the conditional prices listed in Table 1.
This process was repeated until one of the three termination rules applies.
All of them were common knowledge since the beginning of the game. The
termination rules were the following: (a) subjects reached the 10th period of
play, (b) the stock level, after the reproduction, was below 12 units, or (c) the
total catch was at least as high as the available stock level. When rule (c) applied
and the total catch was larger than the available stock, the remaining units were
divided proportionally to the intended individual catch. In the CONTRACT
treatment the available units were paid at the price dictated by the intended
aggregate catch.
A post-experimental survey was applied with the experiment. All the par-
ticipants were paid at the end of the activity. On average they earned $29,500
Colombian pesos [COP]. This amount was about $15.7 US dollars at the time
of the experiment and corresponds to 1.4 times the daily minimum wage.14 The
whole activity lasted between 80 and 100 minutes per session.
As part of the post-experimental survey we elicit participants’ risk prefer-
ences using an incentivized choice experiment inspired in Binswanger (1980)
and previously implemented by Eckel and Grossman (2008), Barr and Genicot
(2008) and Ca´rdenas and Carpenter (2013). The experimental task consists on
choosing to play one of five lotteries that simultaneously increase in expected
value and payoffs’ variance (see Table C.1).
Subjects are strongly balanced across pricing schemes (see Table C.2). De-
spite the randomization process, the adoption of handlining as fishing technology
is higher for subjects assigned to the CONTRACT treatment. This is a minor
concern since there are no systematic differences in the adoption of other fishing
technologies, and 52% of subjects using handlining reported the use of at least
one additional technology. We also observe a difference across treatments in the
14By August 2104, 1 USD = 1,880 COP. Colombia’s daily minimum wage in 2014 was
20,533 COP.
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number of adults per household, but not in the total household members.
6. Results
6.1. Analysis of group level outcomes
Table 4 reports the differences in efficiency, resource’s duration and aggre-
gate catch between the CONTRACT and the FIXED treatments. The unit of
observation is the group of four fishermen. The results of a Wilcoxon test are
reported in the last column of the table. Each comparison is reported for the
pooled sample, as well as for the INTRINSIC and EXTRINSIC subsamples
separately. We find that, for all three outcomes, the significant effect of the
CONTRACT in the pooled sample is driven by the EXTRINSIC subsample.
We define efficiency as the ratio between the realized and the maximum
group earnings, as shown in equation (1). Efficiency is equal to zero for the Nash
equilibrium prediction, and it is equal to one for the social planner’s solution.
In the EXTRINSIC subsample, the average efficiency increases from 0.166
in the FIXED to 0.533 in the CONTRACT treatment (p-value 0.0103). In the
INTRINSIC subsample, the average efficiency is 0.398 in the FIXED, and it
increases to 0.496 in the CONTRACT treatment. The latter difference is not
statistically significant (p-value 1.000).15
Efficiency =
GroupEarnings−NashEq.Earnings
Max.GroupEarnings−NashEq.Earnings (1)
15This result is robust to an alternative measure of efficiency: the ratio between the realized
and the maximum group earnings, as if everyone would have been paid with the conditional
contract. We compute these hypothetical earnings for subjects in the FIXED treatment, and
compare them with the actual earnings of the subjects in the CONTRACT treatment. The
intuition is that if the efficiency gap between payment schemes is small, then the conditional
rewards are not very salient and subjects are motivated to decrease their extraction effort
by “something else”. Under this alternative definition, the CONTRACT increases efficiency
by 35.8 percent in the EXTRINSIC subsample (p-value 0.0319), whereas in the INTRINSIC
subsample the CONTRACT increases the efficiency by 0.6 percent. However, this increase is
not significant (see Table C.3 in the Appendix).
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Table 4: Comparisons between payment schemes: efficiency, resource’s duration and total
catch. Unit of observation is group. The p-value for the non-parametric Wilcoxon test is
reported in brackets.
CONTRACT FIXED PRICE Difference
Efficiency
Pooled (N=20) 0.518 0.259 0.259**
(0.172) (0.213) [0.0155]
Extrinsic (N=12) 0.533 0.166 0.366**
(0.229) (0.106) [0.0103]
Intrinsic (N=8) 0.496 0.398 0.098
(0.018) (0.274) [1.000]
Duration [rounds]
Pooled 6.80 5.50 1.30*
(1.87) (1.51) [0.0969]
Extrinsic 6.83 4.83 2.00*
(2.48) (0.75) [0.0855]
Intrinsic 6.75 6.50 0.25
(0.50) (1.91) [0.8809]
Total Yield
Pooled 135.2 122.0 13.2**
(8.76) (11.50) [0.0125]
Extrinsic 138.2 117.0 21.2***
(10.23) (5.73) [0.0064]
Intrinsic 130.75 129.5 1.25
(3.50) (14.79) [1.000]
Standard deviation in parenthesis. p-values in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find similar differences in terms of the resource duration. In the FIXED
treatment the mean duration of the resource is 5.50 periods compared to 6.80
periods in the CONTRACT treatment (p-value 0.097). This effect is driven by
the EXTRINSIC subsample, where the introduction of the conditional contract
increases the resource’s average duration from 4.8 to 6.8 rounds (p-value 0.086).
In the INTRINSIC subsample, on the other hand, resource duration increases
from 6.50 to 6.75 with the conditional contract (p-value 0.881).
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The structure imposed on the resource dynamics allows us to explore in depth
the differences of resource duration. We employ survival analysis to exploit the
time variation of the final round for each group. The effect of the conditional
contract, as well as the differences between the two fishermen communities, are
robust to the use of non-parametric and parametric survival analysis models
(see Appendix A).16
For the aggregate catch we also find an effect of the pricing scheme. In the
EXTRINSIC subsample the group’s total yield increases 18.1% in the CON-
TRACT treatment (p-value 0.006). In the INTRINSIC subsample, on the other
hand, the 0.9% increase in the group’s total yield associated to the CONTRACT
treatment is non-significant (p-value 1.000).
6.2. Analysis of individual extraction effort
Participants in our experiment choose, every round, whether to exert 1, 2
or 3 units of extraction effort. The mean and median effort per period are
1.72 and 2 units, respectively. We limit our analysis to the first four periods to
not overweight groups whose resource lasted longer. Within this range, where
all groups are observed, the mean effort increases to 1.82. We find that the
CONTRACT decreases the effort per round 0.21 units compared to the FIXED
treatment. Besides, in the INTRINSIC subsample the effort per round is 0.20
units lower than in the EXTRINSIC subsample.
We further analyze the differences in the dynamics of the chosen effort levels.
After the first round of play, in the FIXED treatment we observe a substitu-
tion from the intermediate (e = 2) to the high (e = 3) extraction effort level.
Contrarily, in the CONTRACT treatment the substitution goes from the inter-
mediate (e = 2) to the low (e = 1) extraction effort level. A full description of
the chosen effort levels over time is presented in the Appendix B, where we use
a simplex to illustrate the different trajectories between payment schemes and
16In the parametric model the logistic growth function is explicitly considered by assuming
a non-monotonic hazard rate.
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between subsamples.
Being aware of these divergent trajectories, we ask whether social norms
linked to the history of the resource’s extraction can explain part of the het-
erogeneity in the conditional contract ’s effectiveness. Think, for instance, that
people care about their extraction level with respect to others, and respond re-
ciprocally to any deviation. On a positive reciprocity path, when people chooses
a low extraction effort because the others also do so, the conditional rewards
may increase the salience of the material benefits by providing an immediate
reward (i.e., a higher price). It may lead to a positive relationship between the
conditional contract and the extrinsic motivation.
A different social norm could be that people care about their extraction
level with respect to the state of the resource. In other words, a subject may
be willing to decrease their extraction, even if others’ extraction effort is high,
to prevent the resource’s depletion. This scenario is more likely to occur in
presence of a strong intrinsic motivation.
We aim to detect behaviors that fit any of these norms by analyzing how
the subjects’ extraction effort in period t responds to the group behavior in
period t − 1. We will find support to the reciprocity norm if the individual
effort moves in the same direction than the lagged aggregate effort. A reaction
in the opposite direction will be indicative of preferences to avoid the resource’s
collapse.
We use a random-effects ordered logistic model with the exerted effort as
dependent variable. The multiple observations per subject are very likely to be
correlated due to the dynamic nature of the stock and the repeated interactions
within the group. We therefore limit our analysis to the first four periods of the
game, we control for the current stock level using a quadratic polynomial, and
we cluster the standard errors at the group level.
We compute separate regressions for the EXTRINSIC and INTRINSIC sub-
samples. The reason is that we expect to detect different norms according to
the relative intensity of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. We consider four
different specifications of past aggregate behavior: the lagged aggregate yield
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from the group (
∑
Yt−1) and from the other group members (
∑
−i Yt−1), as
well as the lagged aggregate effort from the group (
∑
et−1) and the other group
members (
∑
−i et−1). We also include an interaction term between the past
aggregate behavior and the CONTRACT treatment. This interaction aims to
capture any potential association between a given social norm and a pricing
scheme.
Table 5 reports the regression coefficients. As the purpose of this exercise
is to detect differential responses to the lagged aggregate behavior we will not
interpret the estimated magnitudes.17 We find evidence for the willingness to
avoid the resource collapse in the INTRINSIC subsample. The coefficient for
the lagged aggregate behavior is negative and statistically significant in all the
four specifications (see columns 1-4). On the other hand, we find evidence of
the reciprocity norm in the EXTRINSIC subsample, but only for the CON-
TRACT treatment. The corresponding interaction term is positive in all four
specifications, and statistically significant in three of them (see columns 5-8).
6.3. The correlation of extraction effort and individual characteristics
We take the econometric model from subsection 6.2 and add a set of in-
dividual characteristics as covariates. The purpose of this exercise is to check
whether risk preferences influence the extraction decision; and also to look for
correlations between extraction effort and characteristics associated to the labels
of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
The econometric specification includes the subject’s choice in the incen-
tivized risk elicitation task, an ordinal measure of the degree of risk aversion.
We do not find a statistically significant correlation between extraction effort
and risk preferences in any of the fishermen communities (see Table C.4 in the
Appendix). We argue that is not likely to be an issue of measurement error given
17The exponentiated regression coefficient exp(βk) can be interpreted as the multiplicative
effect that an additional unit in xk has on the probability of increasing the extraction effort
from e = {1} to e = {2, 3} or from e = {1, 2} to e = {3}.
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the simplicity of the risk elicitation protocol (Eckel and Grossman, 2008). And
also because the correlation between the measure of risk aversion and the sub-
jects’ reported gambling behavior is highly significant (Spearman’s ρ = 0.194,
p-value 0.034).
The econometric specification also includes three variables associated to the
fishermen’s market and technological constraints: whether or not they sell their
catch to a local buyer, the boat ownership status and the reported fishing gear.
In the INTRINSIC subsample, selling to a local buyer is negatively corre-
lated with extraction effort. We speculate that the effect of the local buyers’
provision of informal insurance dominates the effect of the buyers’ greater bar-
gaining power, fostering a more efficient outcome. We also find that boat own-
ership is positively correlated with extraction effort. We speculate that this is a
reflection of the appropriation norms associated to ownership (i.e., boat owners
get a larger proportion of the shared earnings), and that ownership of physical
assets reveals a tendency to secure a larger share of the common resources.
For the EXTRINSIC subsample we find that the use of the highly extractive
gill nets is positively correlated with extraction effort. We do not find any effect
for the use of the less extractive cast nets. The excluded category gathers the
low extractive techniques handlining and harpoon fishing, plus the harmful but
seldom reported drag nets.18
7. Discussion
7.1. Heterogeneous effects of the conditional contract between populations
As an attentive reader may anticipate, the explanation to the heterogeneity
between subsamples involves the INTRINSIC and EXTRINSIC labels adopted
in this paper. Below, we present an argument connecting the intensity of intrin-
sic and extrinsic motivations with the management of an open access resource.
18We ran an alternative specification with a categorical variable for drag nets, but its coef-
ficient is not statistically significant. The regression results are available upon request.
28
We consider the relationship between present and future rewards for each com-
munity, separately; and how the conditional rewards come at play in each case.
Consider the INTRINSIC subsample. The healthier state of the resource
and the subjects’ compliance with the socially accepted extraction levels reveal
a positive valuation of the future stock. Hence, there is a tradeoff between
present and future rewards from resource consumption because long-term re-
wards are sufficiently salient. We argue that the introduction of the conditional
contract does not distort the optimal choice in this tradeoff. The reason is that
the contract simultaneously increases the immediate and the future rewards.
Moreover, the material nature of the immediate reward creates a signal extrac-
tion problem (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006), where fishermen initially influenced
by their intrinsic motivation would not like to appear as “too greedy” by shifting
their extraction effort downwards.
For the EXTRINSIC subsample the valuation of the future stock is negligi-
ble given the poorer state of the resource. The absence of norms or institutions
granting a future share of the common resource eliminates the intertemporal
tradeoff for its consumption. We argue that, lacking any future reward for sus-
tainability, the conditional contract becomes highly salient. Besides, the signal
extraction problem is less concerning when the extrinsic motivations dominate
the intrinsic ones.
One potential concern with our results is that they might be explained by dif-
ferences between the communities that were not contemplated under the labels
INTRINSIC and EXTRINSIC. Table 2 shows that fishermen in the INTRINSIC
subsample are younger and have a higher educational attainment than those in
the EXTRINSIC subsample. One may expect that such characteristics will
make fishermen in the INTRINSIC subsample more attentive to the additional
rewards embedded in the conditional contract. However, this is the community
where the CONTRACT treatment has the lower effect. If anything, the un-
observed ability to profit from these rewards is downward-biasing the reported
effect.
Another concern raised by the differences in age and education is that the
29
sampling procedure was systematically different between communities. For in-
stance, younger fishermen that should have been part of the EXTRINSIC sub-
sample did not participate because they have a higher reservation wage. We
argue that this is not very likely to be an issue in our data because the experi-
ments were conducted after working hours or in days when weather conditions
were not suitable for fishing.
However, a different way to interpret the demographic differences between
subsamples is that they may indicate a selection effect in terms of who becomes
fisherman in each community. The EXTRINSIC subsample has a lower stock
level and better access to markets. Hence, the outside options for the young and
more educated subjects may be better than in the INTRINSIC subsample. The
fact that this explanation fits our data imposes a more careful interpretation
of our findings. The results apply within the population of existing fishermen,
but we cannot guarantee that the effect holds if the implementation of the
conditional contract attracts a new and different set of subjects to the fishing
activity.
An additional consideration is that fishermen in the INTRINSIC subsample
took part in a prior investigation studying the relationship between resilience
and the appropriation of ancestral knowledge. This intervention could have
strengthen the social norms regulating their economic activities. However, it
does not represent an issue with the validity of our results because, if anything,
this prior intervention increase the relative importance of the intrinsic motiva-
tion within the INTRINSIC subsample.
7.2. Conditional rewards and reciprocity in CPR games
We find evidence of reciprocity with the conditional contract but not with the
fixed price. Besides, this reciprocity is only found in the EXTRINSIC subsam-
ple. Two mechanisms may explain the differences between payment schemes: a
coordination-enhancing effect and the affordability to reciprocate. First, Falk
et al. (2002) show that the presence of conditional cooperators transforms the
commons dilemma into a coordination game. We argue that the conditional
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contract amplifies this effect by providing multiple focal points, with better
prices acting as higher attainable rewards. Second, given that engaging in re-
ciprocal behavior is costly (Dreber et al., 2008), the immediate rewards from
the conditional contract make these responses “cheaper” compared to the fixed
price.
Although conditional cooperation is identified in more than half of the par-
ticipants in public good experiments (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and
Ga¨chter, 2010) this behavior is less common in repeated CPR games. Ostrom
(1999) defines as “an unpredicted and strong pulsing pattern” the following
heuristic observed in laboratory experiments: “They increase their investments
in the common pool resource until there is a strong reduction in yield, at which
time they tend to reduce their investments. As the yield again goes up, they
repeat the cycle.” Ca´rdenas (2011) describes, at an aggregate level, a similar
result for a large sample including 865 CPR uses and 230 students. Ve´lez et al.
(2009) connect the conditional cooperation model with the pattern observed in
CPR games by arguing that this conditional behavior can also be explained by
social conformity. They find that a best response function based on conformity
has better explanatory power than a response function based on reciprocity.
Our findings for the INTRINSIC subsample are similar to the existing evi-
dence for repeated CPR games (Ca´rdenas, 2011). Subjects reduce their extrac-
tion effort as a response to a large aggregate extraction level. What is particular
from our experimental results is the reciprocal response to the CONTRACT in
the EXTRINSIC subsample. We are not aware of previous evidence involving
an interplay of positive reciprocity and “rewarding” institutions that increase co-
operativeness in a CPR. On the other hand, a study by Rodriguez-Sickert et al.
(2008) describes the interplay between negative reciprocity and a “sanctioning”
institution. CPR users that voted against the imposition of fines initially had
higher cooperation levels (98%) than those who vote in favor (80%). However, a
spiral of negative reciprocity unraveled cooperation in the groups that rejected
the imposition of fines.
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8. Concluding remarks
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment to test whether or not conditional
rewards for sustainability are efficiency-enhancing in an open access fishery.
The proposed payment scheme conditions the price paid per unit to the group’s
total catch. It increases the collective incentives to reduce the extraction ef-
fort, but maintains the individual incentives to maximize the extraction effort.
The experiment is conducted with groups of fishermen from two neighboring
communities. The communities are labeled as INTRINSIC and EXTRINSIC,
according to how their market and technology constraints shape the relative
importance of the intrinsic motivation to preserve the fishery.
The conditional contract has a positive effect on resource management: it in-
creases the efficiency, the duration of the resource and the total yield. Nonethe-
less, the contract has a differential effect between locations. Fishermen in the
EXTRINSIC subsample profit more from the conditional contract, increasing
efficiency by 200% with respect to a fixed price. On the other hand, fishermen
in the INTRINSIC subsample reach similar efficiency levels with and without
this contract.
We offer two arguments why the conditional contract is more effective when
the extrinsic motivation has more weight than the intrinsic motivation in the ex-
traction decision. First, and particular to the commons problem, the conditional
contract provides immediate rewards that are more salient for the extrinsically
motivated subjects. Second, the material rewards from the contract can gener-
ate a disutility of appearing “too greedy” among subjects with a high intrinsic
motivation.
An underlying mechanism behind the effectiveness of the conditional con-
tract is positive reciprocity. The decrease in extraction effort marginally con-
tributes to an increase in the price per catch. We speculate that the step-wise
price function is of particular importance, as it provides multiple focal points
that help perceiving the social dilemma as a coordination game.
This work sheds light on the usefulness of the history of resource manage-
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ment as a targeting criterion for the allocation of conditional rewards. Providing
these incentive schemes to fishermen communities with a worst history of re-
source management could be politically unpopular, but it seems to be the more
efficiency-enhancing option.
One challenge, in terms of implementation, is how to promote transparency
in the disclosure of the aggregate yields. Reliable information on the aggregate
yield is fundamental to prevent the creation of a parallel market for the excess
supply given a target price. Disclosure incentives should take into account the
fishermen’s willingness to reciprocate reported in this work.
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Appendix A. Resource duration: survival analysis
The survival analysis exploits the time variation of the binding termination
rule of each group. We use it to compare the average time the resource remained
open to extraction across the two payment schemes. Our unit of observation is
group k at time t. We define as failure event (i.e. the moment when the group
will be no longer observed) the period in which the current stock level surpasses
the threshold C˜ = 12. The group’s data is censored in period t = 10 in case the
threshold has not been crossed yet.
For this maximum likelihood estimation it is necessary to specify the distri-
bution from the survival function S(t) = exp(−H(t)), where H(t) corresponds
to the cumulative hazard function. H(t) can be written in terms of the hazard
function h(t) as H(t) =
∫ t
0
h(u)du. We use a non-parametric and a parametric
survival-time model. In the non-parametric estimation we look at the multiplica-
tive effect that a covariate has on the hazard rate. As the effect is time-invariant
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we do not need to estimate a baseline hazard function associated to the time
dimension. In the parametric estimation we look at the multiplicative effect of
the covariates on the survival time. The effect of a covariate is to “shrink” or
“expand” the lifespan of the observed unit. Hence, the baseline hazard function
is parametrized in order to be estimated.
For the non-parametric estimation we use the Cox proportional hazard model.
As the covariates xj have a multiplicative effect on the hazard function we can
write the latter as:
h(tj) = exp(xjβ)
The model’s underlying assumption is that the effect of the covariates xj
is time-invariant. The exponentiated coefficient βk is thus interpreted as the
hazard ratio of the variable xk. That is, the relative probability of failure given
two different levels of xk. Hazard ratios have a multiplicative interpretation.
Hence, the effect of xk is smaller as the hazard ratio exp(βk) is closer to one.
When exp(βk) > 1 the probability of failure increases with xk in 100×(exp(βk)−
1) percent. When 0 ≤ exp(βk) < 1, on the other hand, an increase in xk is
associated with a decrease of 100 × (1 − exp(βk)) percent in the probability of
the failure event.
Table A.1 reports the hazard ratios from the non-parametric estimations
(see column 1). We find that the conditional contract reduces the probability
of resource depletion by 100 × (1 − 0.472) = 52.8 percent with respect to the
fixed price. We also find that fishermen in the INTRINSIC subsample have a
probability of depletion 44.6 percent lower than fishermen in the EXTRINSIC
subsample. The validity of the proportional hazard assumption is tested using
the scaled Schoenfeld residuals (see Table A.2).
We evaluate the differential effect of the conditional contract between com-
munities by introducing an interaction term (see column 2). We find that
the CONTRACT treatment (compared to the FIXED treatment) reduces by
100×(1−0.232) = 76.8 percent the probability of depletion in the EXTRINSIC
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subsample. To compute the effect of the conditional rewards in the INTRINSIC
subsample we need to multiply the hazard rates from the INTRINSIC variable
and its interaction with the CONTRACT variable. We find that, within this
group, the CONTRACT treatment increases by 100×((0.267×4.715)−1) = 9.6
percent the probability of depletion. This effect is statistically significant (p-
value 0.029).
Table A.1: Non-parametric and parametric survival time models. Failure event is the re-
source’s closure or collapse. In the parametric model the survival function is assumed to follow
a log-logistic distribution. In the maximum likelihood procedure is estimated ln(γ) instead of
p. The shape parameter can be retrieved using the formula p = 1/γ. In models (3)-(4) the
variance of the frailty parameter is assumed to follow a Gamma distribution.
Cox model Loglogistic
(no BL hazard function) BL hazard function
Hazard ratios Time ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONTRACT 0.472** 0.232** 1.117* 1.104
(0.164) (0.159) (0.0697) (0.0822)
STRONG 0.554* 0.267** 1.245*** 1.215*
(0.192) (0.143) (0.0688) (0.1231)
CONTRACT × STRONG 4.715* 1.035
(4.175) (0.1265)
Constant 1.722*** 1.728***
(0.0617) (0.0641)
ln(γ) -3.012*** -3.037***
(0.315) (0.316)
ln(θ) 0.0167 0.0456
(0.570) (0.558)
Observations 142 142 142 142
Number of groups 20 20 20 20
Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
For the time ratios coefficients the p-value corresponds to the test exp(βk) = 1.
In the parametric estimation we use a log-logistic distribution to model the
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Table A.2: Test of proportional hazard assumption for the Cox regression model. The test
verifies that the scaled Schoenfeld residuals do not exhibit particular time trends. Schoenfeld
residuals from columns (1)-(2) correspond to the Cox models reported in columns (1)-(2) in
Table A.1, respectively.
(1) (2)
CONTRACT -0.197 -0.311
(0.5239) (0.1255)
INTRINSIC 0.49 0.089
(0.1397) (0.7849)
CONTRACT × INTRINSIC 0.274
(0.2280)
Global test (χ2) 2.19 3.94
(0.3349) (0.2678)
p-values reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
baseline hazard function. This distribution provides a non-monotonic hazard
rate that mimics our resource’s logistic growth function. The stock threshold in
the non-monotonic resource dynamics is given by half of the carrying capacity
(K/2). Once this stock level is surpassed the growth rate start decreasing, and
thus chances of failure start increasing monotonically. The hazard function is
given by:
h(tj) = λjpt
p−1/(1 + λjtp)
with λj = exp(−xjβ).
Given the log-logistic distribution the survival function has the form
S(tj) = 1/(1 + λjt
p). The parameter p captures the shape of the hazard func-
tion h(tj): it is non-monotonic if and only if p > 1. Otherwise, h(tj) decreases
monotonically.
For interpretation purposes we rewrite the survival function as
S(t) = S0 (exp(−xβ + γ)t), where γ = 1/p and  is a random component.
Please note that the covariates have a multiplicative effect on the baseline sur-
vival function S0(t). As we said earlier, using this parametrization the covariates
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“shrink” or “expand” the time elapsed before the failure occurs. This is why the
log-logistic parametrization belongs to a family of models known as Accelerated
Failure Time (AFT).
In the AFT models the exponentiated coefficients are interpreted as time
ratios (instead of hazard ratios). In other words, the time ratio exp(βk) measures
the increase (or decrease) in the expected timespan for two different levels of
the variable xk. When exp(βk) > 1 the failure event is expected to take 100×
(exp(βk) − 1) percent more time to occur. Contrarily, when 0 ≤ exp(βk) < 1
the failure event is expected to take 100 × (1 − exp(βk)) percent less time to
occur.
We specify in the parametric model that all the observations from the same
group (at different points in time) share the same likelihood to experience the
failure event. This is known as “shared frailty” and it allows us to control
for common group effects when we have repeated observations within a group.
In addition, we also control for the between-group variation by introducing a
parameter α in the hazard function to capture the overdispersion. We assume
that α follows a Gamma distribution g(α) with mean one and variance θ.19
We report the time ratios exp(βk) from the parametric model in Table A.1
(see column 3). We find that the CONTRACT treatment increases the expected
elapsed time before resource depletion in 100× (1.117− 1) = 11.7 percent (with
respect to the FIXED treatment). The differential effect between locations
is also observed in the parametric model. The expected elapsed time before
depletion is 24.5 percent larger in the INTRINSIC subsample compared to the
EXTRINSIC subsample.
The estimation of the parameter ln(γ) in the log-logistic indicates that p =
19Two different functional forms are often used for g(α), a Gamma distribution and an
inverse Gaussian distribution. The difference between these functional forms is what happens
to the initial ratio c between the hazard rates from two groups sharing the same frailty as
t approaches infinity. With the Gamma distribution the gap disappears. With the inverse
Gaussian distribution the ratio tends to c1/2 as t→∞ (Gutierrez, 2002).
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20.5. This is an indication that the assumed distribution successfully captures
the non-monotonic hazard rate from the exploited resource.
The estimation results with the interaction term between the CONTRACT
and the INTRINSIC variables are reported in column 4. The interaction coeffi-
cient is not statistically different from one. The CONTRACT and INTRINSIC
coefficients are less precisely estimated. Although their magnitude is almost the
same, their statistical significance decreases.
Appendix B. Dynamics of the individual extraction effort
We use a simplex to explore the dynamics of effort choices. The path within
this simplex provides information regarding the substitution of strategies over
time. Figure B.1 shows the comparison between pricing schemes (see panel a)
and between communities (see panel b). Each point in the simplex represents a
triad (e1, e2, e3) indicating the proportion of subjects in treatment k and period
t that were following the strategies e = 1, e = 2 and e = 3, respectively. The
values of e1, e2 and e3 can be read on the left, right and bottom scales of the
triangle, in that specific order. For instance, the triad (0, 0, 1), corresponding
to the Nash equilibrium of the game, will be located in the bottom left vertex
of the triangle.
Points within a simplex are chronologically connected by lines. The an-
gle (measured from the horizontal axis) of the connecting lines reveals which
strategies were substituted between consecutive periods. A 0◦ angle implies
a substitution from e = 3 to e = 2, a 60◦ angle implies a substitution from
e = 3 to e = 1, and a 120◦ angle implies a substitution from e = 2 to e = 1.
Adding 180◦ to each one of these angles means that the substitution between
strategies goes on the opposite direction. For the analysis we focus on the first
four periods, before any group experienced the resource’s collapse. Periods 1
to 4 were marked in the simplex with full circles, and subsequent periods with
hollow circles.
We find that the low extraction effort (e = 1) is chosen more often in the
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Figure B.1: Ternary plot with the distribution of effort units per period. Each circle rep-
resents one point in time. Circles are chronologically connected. The comparison between
pricing schemes is shown in panel (a). The comparison between intrinsically and extrinsically
motivated communities is shown in panel (b). Colored circles correspond to the first four
periods. Hollow circles correspond to the last six periods.
CONTRACT (49%) than in the FIXED treatment (29%). This is compensated
by a smaller proportion of intermediate effort (e = 2) choices: 31% in the
CONTRACT treatment and 49% in the FIXED treatment.
In the CONTRACT treatment we observe an initial movement towards
northwest, indicating a substitution of e = 2 for e = 1. Subsequent move-
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ments are negligible: they are characterized by small shifts between e = 1 and
e = 3 back and forth. In the FIXED treatment we observe an initial movement
in the simplex in the west direction, i.e., a substitution of e = 2 for e = 3.
This is followed by a decrease in the proportion of e = 1, as is indicated by a
movement to the bottom.
Fishermen in the INTRINSIC subsample are more likely to choose the low
extraction effort (46%) than their neighbors in the EXTRINSIC subsample
(34%). Most of this offset is compensated by the proportion of high effort
(e = 3) choices: 16% and 24%, respectively.
The observed dynamics fit a reciprocity-based explanation in the EXTRIN-
SIC but not in the INTRINSIC subsample. In the EXTRINSIC subsample
the actions e = 1, e = 2 and e = 3 are initially followed by 27.1, 54.2 and 18.7
percent of the participants, respectively. This is followed by a shift towards
northwest, indicating a substitution of e = 2 for e = 1. In the INTRINSIC
subsample we observe that e = 1, e = 2 and e = 3 are played in the first period
by 56.3, 40.6 and 3.1 percent of the subjects, respectively. Despite the high
cooperation rates at the beginning, the proportion of subjects that chose e = 1
decreases by half by the third period. The movement towards south is partially
reversed in the fourth period.
A comparison between the colored and the hollow circles shows an evident
pattern: points in the simplex tend to move upwards over time because lower
effort levels guarantee that the resource is sustained longer. However, the sepa-
ration between the “clusters” of colored and hollow points is particularly striking
in the EXTRINSIC subsample. It may be an indication of the largest effect of
the contract. Indeed, within this community, period 6 was reached by 50% of
the groups in the CONTRACT treatment and only by 16% of the groups in the
FIXED treatment.
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Appendix C. Additional Tables
Table C.1: Lotteries proposed to elicit risk aversion preferences. The r parameter corre-
sponds to the coefficient of relative risk aversion in the utility function U(x) = (x1−r)/(1−r).
The reported payoffs were offered in Colombian pesos.
Lottery Outcomes Expected
Value
Variance in
Payoffs
Risk Aversion Range
(CRAA)
A 5,000 — 5,000 5,000 0× 106 r > 3.26
B 4,000 — 8,000 6,000 4× 106 3.26 ≥ r > 1.11
C 3,000 — 11,000 7,000 16× 106 1.11 ≥ r > 0.68
D 2,000 — 14,000 8,000 36× 106 0.68 ≥ r > 0.47
E 1,000 — 17,000 9,000 64× 106 0.47 ≥ r > 0
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Table C.2: Mean tests by pricing scheme. For categorical variables we report the p-value for
the Chi-squared test instead of the t-test. The abbreviation [COP] refers to Colombian pesos.
FIXED PRICE CONTRACT
Mean Mean Difference p-value
(a) Fishing inputs and market access
Sells to fish gatherer 0.675 0.575 0.100 0.362
Boat ownership 0.625 0.600 0.025 0.821
Handlining 0.550 0.800 -0.25** 0.017
Harpoon 0.225 0.150 0.075 0.397
Cast net 0.175 0.200 -0.025 0.778
Fish traps 0.025 0.075 -0.050 0.311
Gill net / Trammel 0.375 0.275 0.100 0.346
”Boliche” 0.175 0.100 0.075 0.336
(b) Socioeconomic characteristics
Age 44.7 43.5 1.2 0.709
Education [years] 3.70 3.18 0.53 0.460
Other economic activities 0.500 0.600 -0.100 0.375
Weekly earnings [1,000 × COP] 152.949 155.500 -2.551 0.930
Perceived relative wealth [1-10] 3.23 3.48 -0.25 0.611
No. adults in household 3.03 4.03 -1.00*** 0.005
No. children in household 1.98 1.50 0.48 0.126
Perceived luck when fishing [1-10] 7.05 6.23 0.83 0.206
Gambling in dominoes 0.525 0.475 0.050 0.660
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.3: Between-treatments comparison of efficiency levels. Efficiency is defined as the
groups’ earnings as if the conditional contract was applied in both treatments. Maximum
efficiency level is $666 according to the social planner’s solution.
CONTRACT FIXED PRICE Difference
(applying CONTRACT prices)
Efficiency
Pooled (N=20) 0.6683 0.5595 0.1088*
(0.0365) (0.0455) [0.0786]
Extrinsic (N=12) 0.6780 0.4995 0.1785**
(0.0627) (0.0340) [0.0319]
Intrinsic 0.6536 0.6495 0.0041
(0.0061) (0.0896) [0.9651]
Standard deviation in parenthesis. p-values in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.4: Random-effects ordered logistic model with individual characteristics explaining
exerted effort. Standard errors are clustered at the group level. In the estimation are consid-
ered the observations from periods 1 to 4 only. Columns (1)-(3) correspond to the INTRINSIC
subsample. Columns (4)-(6) correspond to the EXTRINSIC subsample.
Dependent Variable INTRINSIC EXTRINSIC
Exerted effort eit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONTRACT -1.898* -2.114** -2.044** -5.614** -5.322** -4.867**
(1.102) (0.969) (1.024) (2.303) (2.269) (2.327)∑
−i et−1 -0.505*** -0.545*** -0.543*** -0.118 -0.105 -0.0475
(0.193) (0.200) (0.189) (0.264) (0.269) (0.273)
CONTRACT ×∑−i et−1 0.346 0.419** 0.412** 0.752** 0.708** 0.625*
(0.215) (0.190) (0.203) (0.348) (0.348) (0.332)
Lottery -0.0799 -0.0323 -0.0256 0.0383 0.0985 0.104
(0.197) (0.185) (0.228) (0.172) (0.198) (0.193)
Sells to Fish Gatherer -1.081*** -0.970*** -0.934*** -0.417 -0.166 -0.290
(0.342) (0.346) (0.334) (0.616) (0.538) (0.537)
Boat Ownership 0.830** 0.892*** 0.852*** 0.525 0.567 0.549
(0.397) (0.343) (0.289) (0.409) (0.406) (0.386)
Cast Net 0.267 -0.00149 -0.0484 -0.685 -0.686 -0.463
(0.393) (0.444) (0.464) (0.633) (0.677) (0.727)
Gill Net -0.272 -0.343 -0.272 0.761** 0.750** 0.648*
(0.582) (0.384) (0.313) (0.347) (0.372) (0.386)
α1 -10.92* -9.219* -8.993 -2.583 -2.076 -2.433
(5.635) (5.471) (5.704) (3.257) (3.282) (3.358)
α2 -8.858 -7.137 -6.916 -0.0359 0.477 0.0916
(5.596) (5.507) (5.772) (3.082) (3.132) (3.181)
σ2u 0.251 0.196 0.169 2.071 2.002 1.833
(0.290) (0.314) (0.309) (1.700) (1.479) (1.507)
Luck perception and gambling controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Wealth perception and income controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 96 96 96 144 144 141
Number of ID 32 32 32 48 48 47
Additional controls: current stock level St in linear and quadratic form. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix D. Experimental Protocol
The following instructions will be given in Spanish to the participants. The
participants could interrupt and ask questions at any time. Whenever the fol-
lowing type of text and font e.g. [MONITOR: Complete the example removing
20 magnets and inserting again 5 magnets.] is found below, it refers to specific
instructions to the monitor at that specific point that will not be read out loud.
Instructions
Greetings. We want to thank everyone here for attending the call, and specially thank
to (the local organization that helped in the logistics) who made this possible. We
will spend about two hours and a half between explaining the exercise, playing it and
finishing with a short survey at the exit. So, let us get started.
The following exercise is a different and entertaining way of participating actively
in a project about the economic decisions of individuals. Besides participating in
the exercise, and being able to earn some cash, you will participate in a community
workshop next (date and time of the meeting) to discuss the exercise and other matters
about natural resources.
Once the game finishes, we will ask you some information about you and your com-
munity, and then we will give you what you earn during the game. All the collected
information will be treated anonymously, the other participants will not know during
or after the experiment, about your individual decisions and earnings. The funds to
cover these expenditures have been donated by the Latin American and Caribbean
Environmental Economics Program.
1. Introduction
It is very important that while we explain the rules of the game you do not engage in
conversations with other people in your group. This exercise attempts to recreate a
situation where a group of families must make decisions about how to use the resources
of a fishery. In the case of this community, an example would be the extraction of
(name of a fish usually caught in the community) in the (name of an actual local
commons area in that village) zone.
You have been invited to participate in a group of four people. The game in which
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you will participate now is different from the ones others have already played in this
community, thus, the comments that you may have heard from others do not apply
necessarily to this game. This experience is also different from other games in which
you could have been invited to participate years before.
In this game you will play for several periods that are equivalent, for instance, to
weeks of work in which you can complete between one and three fishing trips.
At the end of the game you will receive your earnings in cash according to the
amount of money you accumulate during the exercise. Your earnings will be approxi-
mated to the closest multiple of $1,000 [MONITOR: Give a couple of examples of how
to approximate the game earnings.].
2. The RESOURCE BOARD
Let us begin by presenting the RESOURCE BOARD (See Figure D.1). We will sup-
pose that there are initially 100 units of fish, corresponding to each one of the magnets
in the board. Suppose now that in a given period, or a week in our game, the total
amount of resource caught among the four players was 20 units. This means that we
will remove the last 20 magnets of the board.
Before moving to the next week or period, the remaining fish in the RESOURCE
BOARD will reproduce. The number of newborn fish will depend on the actual number
of fish. At the end of each period, we will count the remaining fish and read the
blue number on the right side of the board indicating the resource’s GROWTH for
that specific stock level. We will add this number of magnets into the RESOURCE
BOARD [MONITOR: Complete the example removing 20 magnets and inserting again
5 magnets.].
As you may have noticed, when there is a lot of fish the resource does not grow
rapidly. This is because there is not enough food for all the fish to reproduce. Simi-
larly, when there is few fish the resource neither grows rapidly. This is because there
are not enough fish that can reproduce themselves. Now that we know how the re-
source is reproduced let’s move to understand how we can extract it.
3. The FISHING TRIPS
Every week, or period, you can make up to three FISHING TRIPS. Each period you
will receive three FISHING FORMS (See Figure D.2). You will use them to indicate
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how many fishing trips you are planning to make in that specific round. You must
fold each FISHING FORM to indicate if you want to fish or not. If you fold it in
one direction the boat will stay in ground (as in the NOT FISHING drawing), and if
you fold it in the opposite direction the boat will go to the sea (as in the FISHING
drawing).
It is very important to keep in mind that the number of FISHING TRIPS you
decide in each period are absolutely individual. You don’t have to show your decision
to the rest of group members if you don’t want to. The monitor will pass collecting
your private decisions to guarantee its privacy.
4. CATCHING FISH (STOCHASCTIC TREATMENT)
To determine your catch the monitor will give you one numbered dice for each FISH-
ING TRIP you decided to make (see Figure D.3). You will have equal probabilities of
having a GOOD, REGULAR or BAD day as you have two faces of the dice marked
with the numbers 5, 3 and 1. A GOOD day gives you 5 FISH UNITS, a REGULAR
day gives you 3 FISH UNITS and a BAD day gives you 1 FISH UNIT [MONITOR:
Show the poster with the unfolded dice.]. The monitor will give you a total of three
dices, the quantity of numbered dices will match your number of FISHING TRIPS
and the remaining dices will be blank on all their sides. In this way we can guarantee
the privacy of your decisions.
Once we know the result of all the FISHING TRIPS in the week, the MONITOR
will calculate and announce publicly the total amount of fish FISH UNITS caught by
the group, will remove the same amount of magnets from the RESOURCE BOARD
and will annotate the weekly earnings (round earnings) for each one of the participants.
5.A. PAYING THE FISH (FIXED PRICE TREATMENT)
The monitor will annotate the FISH UNITS you caught each week. Each FISH UNIT
will be paid at 2 tokens. The monitor will pay, at the end of the game the amount
earned by the fish sold.
5.B. PAYING THE FISH (CONDITIONAL CONTRACT TREATMENT)
The monitor will give annotate the FISH UNITS you caught each week. Each unit
caught will be paid according to the total number of units extracted in the week. After
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Figure D.1: Resource Board. The cells on the left represent the current stock level. The
cerulean cells on the right represent the resource’s growth.
Figure D.2: Fishing form. According to the side in which it is folded it represents one
additional effort unit [FISHING] or not [NOT FISHING].
Figure D.3: Representation of the unfolded dice. The three possible yield levels, 1, 3 and 5,
were equally likely to be draw.
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the monitor announces the total amount of fish caught he will announce the price paid
for each unit of fish according to the following table (See Table 1). [MONITOR: Show
the table with the conditional contract.]. The monitor will pay, at the end of the game
the amount earned by the fish sold.
6.A. FINISHING THE GAME (FIXED PRICE TREATMENT)
The game will finish once we reach the 10th week, or equivalently period 10. However,
if the resource reaches a level below 13 units (only twelve magnets in the RESOURCE
BOARD) the game will finish in advance. If, at some point of the game, the FISH
UNITS caught by the group exceed the remaining FISH UNITS in the board, you
will receive a proportion of the remaining units equal to the proportion of your FISH
UNITS with respect to the group’s FISH UNITS caught in that week. For exam-
ple, suppose that you caught 6 FISH UNITS and the total group caught 24 FISH
UNITS but there were only 20 FISH UNITS remaining in the board. According to
our rule, you will receive the fourth part of the remaining units, this is 5 FISH UNITS.
6.B. FINISHING THE GAME (CONDITIONAL CONTRACT TREATMENT)
The game will finish once we reach the 10th week, or equivalently period 10. However,
if the resource reaches a level below 13 units (only twelve magnets in the RESOURCE
BOARD) the game will finish in advance. If, at some point of the game, the FISH
UNITS caught by the group exceed the remaining FISH UNITS in the board, you
will receive a proportion of the remaining units equal to the proportion of your FISH
UNITS with respect to the group’s FISH UNITS caught in that week, and they will
be paid according to the total FISH UNITS the group was expecting to catch. For
example, suppose that you caught 6 FISH UNITS and the total group caught 24 FISH
UNITS but there were only 20 FISH UNITS remaining in the board. According to
our rule, you will receive the fourth part of the remaining units, this is 5 FISH UNITS
and will be paid at $3 each.
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